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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
A jury convicted Raymond Whitney of first degree murder 
in state court, and sentenced him to death. We are now 
asked to review the district court's grant of a writ of habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254. The district court 
concluded that Whitney was entitled to habeas relief 
because the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the 
defense of voluntary intoxication under Pennsylvania law. 
For the reasons that follow, we will reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 10, 1981, 
Whitney climbed through a second story window of the 
apartment of Juliana Minor armed with a knife. Minor was 
in bed when Whitney encountered her inside the 
apartment. Whitney asked her if she recognized him, and 
threatened to kill her if she did not keep quiet. She told 
Whitney that she did not recognize him even though she 
actually did recognize him from the neighborhood. When 
Minor claimed she had no money, Whitney responded by 
taking some valuables from her jewelry box and helping 
himself to a can of beer from her refrigerator. Before 
leaving, he cut the phone wire, unscrewed the mouthpiece 
on the handset of her telephone, and removed the speaker 
from inside the phone, thus rendering the phone 
inoperable. Whitney then announced that he was in the 
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wrong apartment and left by climbing through a window 
back onto the ledge. 
 
Moments later, he entered a neighboring second-floor 
apartment where a recently married couple, Mahin Murtaza 
and Jehad Taha, were sleeping. Upon being awakened by 
noise in their living room, Taha went to investigate. A few 
minutes later Murtaza heard someone strike Taha, and she 
called the police. While she was attempting to place the 
call, Taha reappeared in the bedroom with wounds on his 
chest and face. Whitney was standing behind him holding 
a knife to Taha's neck. Murtaza immediately hung up the 
phone although she had not been able to complete the call 
and summon police. Whitney angrily asked Murtaza why 
she was on the phone, and threw Taha on the bed. 
 
As this was occurring, the phone rang. Whitney directed 
Murtaza to answer it and say that everything was fine. After 
she complied, Whitney grabbed the phone and hung up. 
The call had been a "callback" by a police operator who 
phoned the apartment because of the abrupt manner in 
which Murtaza's call ended. 
 
Whitney then threatened the couple, demanded money 
and jewelry, and ripped pierced earrings from Murtaza's 
ears. He also threatened to rape Murtaza, and proceeded to 
tear off her brassiere. Taha gave Whitney jewelry; however, 
Whitney demanded more and ordered the couple to go to 
the living room where Murtaza's purse was located. When 
Taha refused Whitney's demand and instead went toward 
the bathroom, Whitney stabbed him again. Whitney then 
forced Taha into the living room where Murtaza emptied the 
contents of her purse onto the floor. However, Whitney was 
still not satisfied and expressed disappointment over the 
amount of money Murtaza had in her purse. After drinking 
some water from the refrigerator, Whitney hugged Murtaza, 
touched her on the breast, reiterated that he wanted to 
have intercourse with her, and then threw her to the floor. 
When Taha protested, Whitney stabbed him yet again, and 
told Murtaza, "[a]fter I kill him, then I am going to fuck 
you." Whitney then unfastened his pants and pulled out his 
penis. Taha tried to stop Whitney, and a scuffle ensued 
during which Whitney repeatedly told Taha, "I'm going to 
kill you." However, the scuffle provided Murtaza with an 
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opportunity to run for help, and she ran from the 
apartment into the street. Once outside, she encountered 
two police officers who ran back to her apartment with her. 
They entered in time to see Whitney crouched over Taha, 
pulling a knife out of Taha's chest. They immediately 
arrested Whitney.1 However, Taha had already sustained 
twenty-four stab wounds, and he died soon after being 
taken to a hospital. 
 
In a post-arrest statement, Whitney contended that 
earlier that evening he left a bar and ran into an 
acquaintance. He admitted that he had thereafter entered a 
second-floor apartment in the 3400 block of Powelton 
Avenue, and that he had struggled with and assaulted, a 
man. He told police that he "wasn't drunk then.[He] only 
had a little to drink," and did not recall any stabbing. 
 
Defense counsel moved to suppress Whitney's statement, 
Minor's identification, and physical evidence that had been 
seized from Whitney following his arrest. The motion was 
denied, and Whitney was tried before a jury on charges that 
included first degree murder and burglary. 
 
Ms. Minor and Ms. Murtaza testified for the 
Commonwealth at Whitney's trial. Minor testified that 
Whitney "walked funny," that he was "woozy," and that his 
speech was "funny" during the incident. Her testimony 
therefore provided some evidence that he had been 
intoxicated when he stabbed his victim. In addition, on 
cross-examination, the officer who transported Whitney to 
police headquarters testified that Whitney's breath smelled 
of alcohol. 
 
The Commonwealth's case-in-chief included six witnesses 
who testified that they had not observed evidence of 
Whitney's intoxication from 4:00 a.m. on. Although Whitney 
did not testify, he called three defense witnesses who 
testified that he had been drinking at a party into the early 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In a search pursuant to the arrest, police recovered several items 
Whitney had stolen from both apartments. Police also seized Whitney's 
blood-stained clothing and a knife. Subsequent laboratory analysis 
confirmed the presence of blood on both the knife and Whitney's 
clothing. That blood was consistent with Taha's blood type. 
 
                                4 
  
morning hours of October 10th. Whitney also introduced 
evidence of three hospitalizations from alcohol overdoses 
between 1973 and 1976. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth 
produced additional evidence of Whitney's sobriety on the 
night of the murder. 
 
The jury convicted Whitney of first degree murder, two 
counts of robbery, two counts of burglary, attempted rape, 
indecent assault, terroristic threats, and two counts of 
possession of an instrument of crime. Whitney called one 
witness during the ensuing penalty phase, and the jury 
thereafter imposed the death sentence. After post-verdict 
motions were denied, the trial judge formally imposed 
sentence. 
 
II. Procedural Background 
 
Whitney was represented by trial counsel on direct 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.2  In that appeal 
he raised the following issues: 
 
       (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 
       which established Whitney's diminished capacity 
       due to intoxication and negated his intent to 
       commit first degree murder;3 
 
       (2) the trial court erred in denying a motion to 
       suppress his statement because he lacked the 
       requisite mental capacity to make an intelligent, 
       informed, knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
       Miranda rights; 
 
       (3) the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in his 
       penalty phase summation; and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Appeal directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is permissible 
when a defendant has received the death penalty. See 42 Pa. C.S. 
SS 9711(h)(a) and 722(4). 
 
3. Although Whitney only challenged the weight of the evidence, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed both the weight of the evidence 
and the sufficiency of the evidence in its opinion, noting that the court 
routinely examines the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the first 
degree murder conviction in death penalty cases. See Commonwealth v. 
Whitney, 512 A.2d 232, 236 (Pa. 1986) (citing Commonwealth v. 
Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26-27 n.3 (1982)). 
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       (4) various defects in the Pennsylvania death penalty 
       statute. 
 
On July 15, 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed Whitney's conviction and upheld his death 
sentence. See Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 
A.2d 1152 (1986).4 On September 25, 1990, Pennsylvania's 
governor signed a warrant for Whitney's execution. 
 
On November 13, 1990, Whitney filed a pro se collateral 
petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 
Pa. C. S. S 9501 et seq. (the "PCRA"), and his execution was 
stayed until counsel could be appointed. Thereafter, 
Whitney filed four amended petitions in which he alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal.5 
An evidentiary hearing was held on Whitney's PCRA claims 
on February 1, 1993. Whitney testified at that hearing as 
did his aunt and cousin. They testified in support of 
Whitney's claim that trial counsel should have presented 
their testimony in mitigation at the penalty phase. 
Whitney's trial counsel did not, however, testify at the 
PCRA hearing. The PCRA court denied relief on January 3, 
1995, and Whitney appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. He argued that trial counsel had been ineffective in 
failing to: 
 
       (1) advise Whitney of his right to testify, call him to 
       testify at trial concerning, inter alia, his intoxicated 
       state, or call him to testify at the penalty phase; 
 
       (2) comply with his purported intention to be tried by 
       a trial judge and not a jury; 
 
       (3) call a physician to testify at the guilt phase to 
       support a claim of diminished capacity; 
 
       (4) object when Sergeant Robert Wagner testified that 
       Whitney maintained silence at the time of his 
       arrest; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Whitney apparently did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 
5. The petitions were dated March 8, 1991, September 23, 1991, 
December 17, 1991, and June 4, 1992. 
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       (5) present evidence of an absence of a significant 
       history of criminal convictions at the penalty 
       phase; 
 
       (6) present evidence of his age of twenty-two years at 
       the time of the murder as a mitigating 
       circumstance at the penalty phase; 
 
       (7) object to jury instructions and the verdict slip at 
       the penalty phase because they violated Mills v. 
       Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); 
 
       (8) object to the jury instructions at the penalty phase 
       because the term "torture" was not defined; and 
 
       (9) call his aunt and cousin as witnesses to the 
       penalty phase. 
 
While his appeal was pending before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, Whitney filed a second pro se PCRA 
petition. It was dismissed without prejudice on August 4, 
1997, because Whitney's appeal of the dismissal of his first 
PCRA petition was still pending before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. Approximately six months later, on 
February 26, 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v. 
Whitney, 550 Pa. 618, 708 A.2d 471 (1998), and in April 
1999, the governor signed another warrant for Whitney's 
execution.6 The execution was scheduled for June 3, 1999. 
 
Whitney then sought relief in federal court. The district 
court initially granted a stay of execution on April 22, 1999. 
On May 6, 1999, Whitney, through counsel, filed a petition 
requesting federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.S 2254. He 
argued that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus 
based upon each of the following: 
 
       I. the prosecutor's penalty phase argument was 
       improper; 
 
       II. trial counsel did not render effective assistance 
       because he failed to investigate and present 
       mitigating evidence and presented a harmful 
       closing argument; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Whitney did not file a petition for certiorari in the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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       III. Whitney's statement was improperly admitted 
       at trial because his alleged mental impairments 
       rendered him unable to make a knowing and 
       intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; 
 
       IV. the trial court failed to properly instruct the 
       jury on the nature and use of aggravating and 
       mitigating circumstances in violation of the 
       Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; 
 
       V. the Commonwealth used peremptory challenges 
       to exclude African American potential jurors in 
       violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
       (1986) and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
       (1965); 
 
       VI. the trial court gave an inaccurate and 
       misleading voluntary intoxication instruction, 
       trial counsel ineffectively failed to object and to 
       present all of the available evidence of 
       petitioner's intoxication, and the 
       Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence 
       of petitioner's capacity to form the specific 
       intent required for first degree murder; 
 
       VII. the trial court erred in failing to give a life 
       without possibility of parole instruction to the 
       jury; 
 
       VIII. the sentencing phase jury instructions 
       indicated that mitigating circumstances had to 
       be found unanimously, in violation of Mills v. 
       Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); 
 
       IX. the aggravating circumstance of torture was 
       improperly applied to him; 
 
       X. the aggravating circumstance of "knowingly 
       creat[ing] a grave risk of death to another 
       person in addition to the victim" was 
       improperly applied to him; 
 
       XI. the Commonwealth was improperly permitted 
       to introduce testimony that Whitney used an 
       alias; 
 
                                8 
  
       XII. a Commonwealth witness testified about 
       Whitney's post-arrest and post-Miranda silence 
       in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
       Amendments; 
 
       XIII. trial counsel did not render effective assistance 
       because he failed to advise Whitney of his right 
       to testify; 
 
       XIV. trial counsel did not render effective assistance 
       because he failed to investigate, develop and 
       present evidence of Whitney's innocence of first 
       degree murder; 
 
       XV. the state supreme court's arbitrary 
       proportionality review denied him due process 
       and rendered his death sentence 
       unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment; 
 
       XVI. his death sentence violated various 
       constitutional provisions because it was the 
       result of racial discrimination; 
 
       XVII. all state court counsel did not render effective 
       assistance when they failed to raise and/or 
       litigate the issues discussed in the habeas 
       petition; and 
 
       XVIII. he is entitled to relief because of the cumulative 
       prejudicial effect of the errors alleged in his case.7 
 
On May 22, 2000, the district court held a hearing to 
resolve outstanding issues of exhaustion and procedural 
default. The court also received evidence pertaining to 
claims II, V, VI, VIII, and XII. Whitney's counsel noted that 
the Pennsylvania legislature had enacted the time bar for 
filing PCRA petitions under 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9545(b)(1) while 
Whitney's appeal from the denial of PCRA relief was 
pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. When his 
appeal was finally decided in February 1998, the time for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Commonwealth had urged dismissal of Whitney's petition under 
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), because it contained 
exhausted and unexhausted claims. Whitney thereafter filed an amended 
habeas petition deleting claim XVI. He apparently decided to pursue 
claim XVI in state court. 
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filing another PCRA petition containing new claims had 
already expired. Therefore, argued counsel, Whitney's 
failure to assert his habeas claims in another PCRA petition 
should not preclude federal review of the merits of his 
habeas claims. Counsel also argued that, until November 
1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had observed a 
"relaxed waiver" policy in cases involving the death penalty. 
Under that policy, the court entertained all claims raised by 
capital defendants, even though the claims may not have 
been properly preserved or were procedurally barred. 
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court often reviewed 
such claims even though they were asserted in PCRA 
petitions that did not meet the time restrictions of 42 Pa. 
C.S.A. S 9545(b)(1). Thus, counsel argued, after the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that the time bar 
was jurisdictional, see Commonwealth v. Banks , 556 Pa. 1 
(1999), and that it would no longer observe the relaxed 
waiver rule, see Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 722 A.2d 638 
(Pa. 1998), any petition filed by Whitney would have been 
untimely. Habeas counsel therefore, argued that the PCRA 
time bar was not an adequate and independent state 
procedural bar precluding federal review of the claims 
which Whitney had not presented in the state courts. 
 
The court accepted Whitney's procedural default 
argument. The court concluded that, although Whitney had 
not presented most of his federal habeas claims to the state 
courts, exhaustion should be excused, and that the PCRA 
time bar was not an adequate and independent state 
ground for denying Whitney relief. 
 
The district court then proceeded to the merits of 
Whitney's challenge to the trial court's instruction on 
voluntary intoxication, and his claim that trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to it 
(claim VI). The substance of that jury instruction is set 
forth later in our discussion. For now, we simply note that 
the trial judge misstated the Commonwealth's burden of 
proving specific intent to kill in Pennsylvania when a 
defendant introduces evidence of voluntary intoxication. 
The district court concluded that the trial court's 
misstatement created a substantial possibility that 
Whitney's jury based its findings on an unconstitutional 
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ground, and that relief was therefore required under Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 381 (1988). The district court 
explained: "We have no way of knowing whether one or 
more jurors found he was too drunk to form the specific 
intent to kill and then relied on the incorrect voluntary 
intoxication instruction in finding him guilty of first degree 
murder, or whether they all believed that he had the 
specific intent to kill and then relied upon the earlier 
correct instruction in convicting him." Dist. Ct. Op. at 19. 
The district court was appropriately concerned with 
ascertaining with "even greater certainty" that a death 
sentence rests on proper grounds. Id. at 20. 
 
The district court also concluded that there was a"plain 
and serious deficiency" in trial counsel's failure to object to 
the charge. The court therefore held that Whitney had met 
the first prong for establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The court also found that Whitney had been 
prejudiced by the error based upon the court's conclusion 
that there was a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. The court found a sufficient possibility that 
at least one juror would not have voted to convict Whitney 
of first degree murder if the court had correctly explained 
that evidence of voluntary intoxication could negate the 
mens rea required for a conviction of first degree murder. 
Id. at 21. The district court granted the writ of habeas 
corpus on that basis and did not reach any of the other 
grounds for relief that Whitney asserted in his habeas 
petition. 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1291, 2253(a). 
The district court's determination of whether an issue has 
been exhausted is subject to plenary review. See 
Shandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(citing Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 
1983)). We also exercise plenary review over the district 
court's legal conclusions, but we review the court's factual 
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conclusions under a clearly erroneous standard. See 
Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1992)); 




A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 
 
A state prisoner must "fairly present" all federal claims to 
the highest state court. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b), O'Sullivan 
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see also Picard v. 
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (state courts should have 
an opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged errors). 
Whitney did not raise his challenge to the trial court's 
instruction on intoxication at any level in the state courts.10 
Whitney has, therefore, failed to exhaust his claim. See 
O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.11 However, we "excuse" a 
failure to exhaust "if it is clear that [the habeas petitioner's] 
claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law." Gray 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Whitney's habeas petition was filed after the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") became effective. However, 
because the issue here is the procedural bar, and the state courts never 
had the opportunity to address Whitney's challenge to the voluntary 
intoxication jury instruction or counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to 
object, we do not apply the restrictive standard of review contained in 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA. 
 
10. Whitney's claim, as he presented it in his amended habeas petition, 
was essentially threefold: (1) the trial court gave an inaccurate and 
misleading voluntary intoxication instruction, and previous counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the error; (2) 
trial 
counsel ineffectively failed to present all of the available evidence of 
petitioner's intoxication; and (3) the Commonwealth presented 
insufficient evidence of petitioner's capacity to form the specific intent 
required for first degree murder. The district court only reached the 
first 
part of the claim, and the appellants have only challenged that ruling on 
appeal. 
 
11. On May 9, 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order in 
In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief 
Cases, No. 218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1, declaring that 
federal habeas petitioners no longer have to appeal to the state supreme 
court. See Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 225 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
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v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 
(1996). See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1) (2001). We have 
explained: 
 
       `Futility' exists where: a state's highest court has ruled 
       unfavorably on a claim involving facts and issues 
       materially identical to those undergirding a federal 
       habeas petition and there is no plausible reason to 
       believe that a replay will persuade the court to reverse 
       its field, where the state provides no means of seeking 
       the relief sought, or where the state courts have failed 
       to alleviate obstacles to state review presented by 
       circumstances such as the petitioner's pro se status, 
       poor handwriting and illiteracy. 
 
Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citations and quotations omitted). However, state 
procedure must "clearly foreclose" state court review of the 
unexhausted claims. See Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 
987 (3d Cir. 1993); Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 681 (3d 
Cir. 1996). The mere fact that it is unlikely that further 
state process is available is insufficient to establish futility. 
See Lines, 208 F.3d at 163 (citing Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 
805 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 
The parties here agree that Whitney must attempt to file 
yet another PCRA petition if he is now to assert his claims 
in state court. See Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 
718, 721 (Pa. 1997) (noting that in Pennsylvania, the PCRA 
is the "sole means for obtaining [collateral] relief and . . . 
supersedes common law remedies"). However, as Whitney 
points out in his brief, the parties also agree that that 
would be a useless exercise because any such petition 
would be dismissed as untimely under 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
S 9545(b)(1). See Appellee's Br. at 10. 
 
Section 9545(b)(1) provides: 
 
       Any petition under this subchapter, including a second 
       or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 
       the date the judgment becomes final, unless the 
       petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: 
 
       (i)  the failure to raise the claim previously was the 
       result of interference by government officials 
       with the presentation of the claim . . . 
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       (ii)  the facts upon which the claim is predicated 
       were unknown to the petitioner and could not 
       have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
       diligence; or 
 
       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 
       was recognized by the Supreme Court of the 
       United States or the Supreme Court of 
       Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 
       this section and has been held by that court to 
       apply retroactively. 
 
Id. A conviction becomes final for PCRA purposes "at the 
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review 
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 
for seeking the review." Lines, 208 F.3d at 164 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 726 A.2d 374, 375 
(1999)).12 It is now clear that this one-year limitation is a 
jurisdictional rule that precludes consideration of the 
merits of any untimely PCRA petition, and it is strictly 
enforced in all cases, including death penalty appeals. See 
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 642 (1998) 
(affirming the denial of a second PCRA petition as time 
barred, and holding that no exception could be made for a 
capital defendant); see also Banks, 726 A.2d at 376 (same, 
noting that "[t]he Legislature has spoken on the requisites 
of receiving relief under the PCRA and has established a 
scheme in which PCRA petitions are to be accorded finality. 
The gravity of the sentence imposed upon a defendant does 
not give us liberty to ignore those clear mandates.").13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 9545(b)(3). 
 
13. In Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1997), we observed that the 
PCRA waiver rules had not been consistently applied in capital cases, 
and held that we could not determine whether further avenues of state 
court review would be "clearly foreclosed" under the PCRA waiver 
provisions with respect to a claim raised in a successive PCRA petition 
in a capital case. We therefore dismissed the claim as unexhausted to 
allow the petitioner to return to the state courts. However, as noted 
above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since held that it will no 
longer relax procedural requirements in capital cases. Accordingly, PCRA 
petitioners who have received the death penalty are held to the same 
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A claim in a PCRA petition that trial counsel and 
previous post-conviction counsel were ineffective for failing 
to raise an issue is also subject to the time bar. 
Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999) 
(holding that the time limit is jurisdictional, and an 
untimely petition would not be addressed simply because it 
is couched in terms of ineffectiveness of counsel or because 
it is filed in a capital case); Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 
487, 746 A.2d 585, 589-90 (2000) (holding that, even where 
a claim of ineffectiveness was asserted at earliest stage of 
proceedings, an allegation of ineffectiveness is not sufficient 
to overcome otherwise untimely claims). 
 
Whitney's conviction became final on October 15, 1986.14 
We are now well beyond the limitation period for filing 
PCRA petitions. Thus, absent one or more of the exceptions 
set forth in S 9545(b)(1), any PCRA petition that Whitney 
might now attempt to file would be untimely and 
unreviewable in the Pennsylvania courts, see 
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 741 A.2d 1258, 
1261 (1999), as none of the statutory exceptions to the time 
bar apply here.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
procedural requirements as all other PCRA petitioners. See Albrecht, 720 
A.2d 693; Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, the 
jurisdictional nature of the PCRA's filing deadlines is now clear. Fahy at 
245 (citing Banks, supra). See also Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 
258, 744 A.2d 717, 726 (2000). 
14. This was ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed 
his sentence, which was at the expiration of the time for filing a 
petition 
for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 
15. Whitney does not allege governmental interference, nor does he argue 
a new retroactive rule of constitutional law. Furthermore, Whitney's 
challenge to the jury instruction and his assertion that previous counsel 
were ineffective for failing to raise the error do not constitute claims 
of 
after discovered evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 
562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780, 785-786 (2000) (subsequent counsel's review 
of previous counsel's representation and conclusion that previous 
counsel was ineffective is not newly discovered"fact" encompassed in the 
exceptions); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911, 915 
(2000) (same). Moreover, even if Whitney's claim amounted to after- 
discovered evidence under the PCRA, Whitney would still have had to file 
his PCRA petition within 60 days of the date that the new evidence was 
discovered, and the sixty-day deadline has long passed. 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
S 9545(b)(2). 
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Accordingly, inasmuch as the Pennsylvania courts would 
lack jurisdiction over any post-conviction petition that 
Whitney might now file, he is "clearly foreclosed" from 
attacking the jury instruction in state court. See Toulson, 
987 F.2d at 988-89. This does not, however, mean that the 
district court properly reached the merits of Whitney's 
claim. In Lines we stated: 
 
       It does not necessarily follow, however, that Lines is 
       entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his 
       unexhausted federal habeas claims merely because it 
       is now futile to attempt to raise them in state court. A 
       finding of futility merely eliminates the procedural 
       pretense of requiring a federal habeas petitioner to 
       return to an unavailable state forum for nonexistent 
       relief. Futility, without more, does not mean that the 
       federal courts may proceed to the merits of the 
       petitioner's claims. 
 
Lines, 208 F.3d at 166. 
 
The parties here continue to argue over the proper 
interpretation, application, and reach of Lines . Accordingly, 
we take this opportunity to reiterate: "claims deemed 
exhausted because of a state procedural bar are 
procedurally defaulted." Id. at 160 (citing McCandless v. 
Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999)) (quotations 
omitted).16 In Lines, the very same PCRA time limit barred 
the petitioner from filing a second PCRA petition. Based 
upon the futility of requiring Lines to cure his procedural 
default, we considered his claims exhausted because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In McCandless, 172 F.3d at 260, we explained: 
 
       When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been "fairly 
       presented" to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the 
       applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the 
exhaustion 
       requirement is satisfied because there is "an absence of available 
       State corrective process." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b). In such cases, 
       however, applicants are considered to have procedurally defaulted 
       their claims and federal courts may not consider the merits of such 
       claims unless the applicant establishes "cause and prejudice" or a 
       "fundamental miscarriage of justice" to excuse his or her default. 
 
Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). 
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" `there [were] no state remedies available to him.' " Lines, 
208 F.3d at 166 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 732). We thus concluded that, "[w]hen exhaustion is 
futile because state relief is procedurally barred, federal 
courts may only reach the merits if the petitioner makes 
the standard showing of `cause and prejudice' or 
establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. (citing 
Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 861 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 
In Lines, we undertook a procedural default analysis of 
cause and prejudice without providing a detailed analysis of 
whether Pennsylvania's time limit was an adequate or 
independent state rule for denying relief. Id.  Here, the 
district court determined that the time limit for filing PCRA 
petitions did not constitute an adequate and independent 
state ground precluding federal review. Perhaps because of 
this, both the Commonwealth and Whitney devote an 
inordinate amount of time in their briefs arguing about 
whether an adequate and independent state ground 
precludes granting Whitney federal habeas relief given his 
procedural default. 
 
Whitney acknowledges that Lines discusses the very state 
procedural rule at issue here, but he argues Lines must be 
distinguished because it was not a capital case, and 
because we did not discuss the adequate state ground 
requirement there. Appellee's Br. at 50. We are 
unimpressed with Whitney's attempt to distinguish Lines as 
a non-capital case. As noted above, the distinction is no 
longer valid for purposes of the application of the PCRA's 
time bar as it pertains to issues of exhaustion and futility. 
See Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 642-43; Commonwealth v. Yarris, 
731 A.2d at 586. Accordingly, the procedural default 
analysis in Lines is indistinguishable from that which we 
must undertake here. Moreover, nothing in the holdings of 
the Supreme Court or in the text of 28 U.S.C. S 2254 
suggests that the exhaustion requirement for defendants 
sentenced to death is different for those defendants who 
receive a lesser sentence. Accordingly, we must determine 
if Whitney can establish cause and prejudice for his 
procedural default. 
 
As noted above, Whitney's cause and prejudice argument 
is intertwined with the merits of his Sixth Amendment and 
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due process claims. He argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the jury charge on 
voluntary intoxication, and that counsel's failure to 
recognize the merits of this argument in state court 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and 
demonstrates the cause and prejudice necessary to excuse 
the procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 
at 750 ("Where a petitioner defaults a claim as a result of 
the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the 
state, which is responsible for the denial as a constitutional 
matter, must bear the cost of any resulting default and the 
harm to the state interests that federal habeas review 
entails.").17 We will begin the inquiry into counsel's 
stewardship by determining if the jury charge was defective. 
 
B. Was The Jury Instruction Erroneous? 
 
Whitney was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to 
18 Pa. C.S.A. S 2502. Section 2502 states in relevant part: 
"[a] criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree 
when it is committed by an intentional killing." Under 
Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth had to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Whitney "[had] the specific 
intent to kill . . . and [was] conscious of his own intention." 
Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 562 Pa. 132, 140 (Pa. 2000). A 
killing in Pennsylvania is with the "specific intent to kill if 
it is willful and deliberate." Id. However, Pennsylvania 
recognizes that someone can be intoxicated to such an 
extent that he/she is not capable of forming a specific 
intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118 (1975). 
 
Given the aforementioned evidence of intoxication, the 
trial court charged the jury on the possible effect of 
voluntary intoxication upon Whitney's mens rea. Inasmuch 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Whitney and the Commonwealth also argue over whether 
Pennsylvania's relaxed waiver rule for capital cases may constitute 
"cause" for Whitney's procedural default. However, it is not necessary for 
us to answer that question here because we conclude that Whitney can 
not make the threshold showing of prejudice. See Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 
167 (1982) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether petitioner had 
demonstrated cause, because he had not suffered actual prejudice 
sufficient to justify collateral relief). 
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as that charge is the sole basis for the disputed relief, we 
will quote the relevant portions at length. The trial court 
instructed the jury: 
 
        With one exception, which I will define later, 
       voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal 
       charge. A person who uses intoxicants cannot become 
       so drunk that he is, for that reason, legally incapable 
       of committing a crime. 
 
        Among the elements of the crime of burglary, 
       attempted rape, possession of an instrument of crime 
       and terroristic threats is that the defendant had a 
       certain criminal intent with respect to each of these 
       crimes at the time they were committed. . . . 
 
        However, in terms of being found guilty, a defendant 
       cannot ordinarily be found guilty of the crimes involved 
       here unless he had the required state of mind--that is, 
       the intent to commit the crime, the criminal intent--at 
       the time of the alleged crime. 
 
        However, in the case of a voluntarily intoxicated 
       defendant, it is not necessary that the defendant be 
       conscious or aware of his own state of mind. It is 
       enough if the required mental state is present 
       somewhere in his drunken mind or expressed in his 
       acts. 
 
        Thus, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
       that the defendant committed particular crimes as I 
       have defined before in my instructions, you should find 
       him guilty of those crimes, even though you believed he 
       was intoxicated at the time. 
 
        However, as I indicated a few moments ago, the 
       general rule is that voluntary intoxication is not a 
       defense to a criminal charge. However, there is one 
       modifying circumstance to that rule which says that 
       the voluntary use of intoxicants does not preclude a 
       person from being legally capable of committing a 
       crime. The qualification is where the crime which is 
       charged is first degree murder. 
 
        In connection with that crime, the defendant is 
       permitted to claim, as a defense, that he was so drunk 
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       at the time of the killing that he did not possess the 
       specific intent to kill required for first degree murder. 
       The Commonwealth has the burden of disproving this 
       defense. 
 
        Thus you cannot find the defendant guilty of first 
       degree murder unless you are satisfied beyond a 
       reasonable doubt that the defendant was not so 
       intoxicated at the time that he was incapable of judging 
       his acts and their consequences or being capable of 
       forming a willful, deliberate and premeditated design to 
       kill. 
       Now, let me repeat that again for you. 
 
        The Commonwealth has the burden of disproving 
       this defense. 
 
        Thus, you cannot find the defendant guilty of first 
       degree murder unless you are satisfied beyond a 
       reasonable doubt that the defendant was so intoxicated 
       at the time that he was incapable of judging his acts 
       and their consequences or incapable of forming a willful, 
       deliberate and premeditated design to kill. 
 
        Voluntary intoxication may reduce a crime of murder 
       from first degree, to third degree. Voluntary 
       intoxication, however, is no defense to a charge of 
       second or third degree murder or of voluntary 
       manslaughter, nor, as I indicated earlier, is it a defense 
       to any of the other crimes with which this defendant is 
       charged. . . . 
 
Appellants App. at pp. 786-89 (emphasis added). All agree 
that the italicized portion of the charge is incorrect and that 
"was" and "so" should have been separated by "not." The 
Commonwealth has argued at several points during the 
proceedings that the error is probably only one of 
transcription. However, there is nothing in the record to 
support such a blase assertion, and we obviously can not 
decide this case on the basis of that unsupported 
argument. 
 
Because the misstatement of law concerns the very 
defense which may negate the specific intent required for 
murder in the first degree, it is potentially a substantial 
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error. The Commonwealth cites to Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 
U.S. 145, 153 (1977), in arguing that this single defect did 
not rise to the level of constitutional error when considered 
in context with the charge as a whole. Despite the"slip of 
the tongue," argues the Commonwealth, the trial court 
properly instructed that voluntary intoxication can negate 
the necessary specific intent and reduce a homicide to third 
degree murder. The Commonwealth reminds us that the 
trial court twice instructed the jury that the prosecution 
shouldered the burden of disproving voluntary intoxication. 
In Henderson, supra, the Court found that the state court's 
omission of an instruction regarding causation in a murder 
instruction was not a constitutional error requiring habeas 
relief because, taken as a whole, the challenged instruction 
sufficiently informed the jury about the element of 
causation. Id. 
 
However, that is quite different from what occurred in 
Whitney's case. Here, the law regarding specific intent was 
explained elsewhere in the jury instruction--in the 
description of different degrees of murder given 
approximately thirty pages before the voluntary intoxication 
instruction (Appellants App. at p. 747-51). That law was 
also correctly explained after the faulty instruction when 
the court answered a specific jury question about the 
degrees of murder, and the elements of burglary, and 
robbery. 808-21. 
 
However, the law on voluntary intoxication insofar as it 
applies to the charge of first degree murder was explained 
only at the single instance quoted above. That instruction 
concluded with a misstatement of the law. There is no 
question that this instruction would have been critical to a 
juror's understanding of the law of voluntary intoxication. 
It was the only time that the legal consequences of 
intoxication with respect to specific intent to kill were 
explained. Cf. Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432, 441 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (finding that, where there was no other language 
in instruction to dilute express instruction that defendant 
had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he had mental disease or defect that negated 
the intent to kill, burden of proof was impermissibly shifted 
to defendant). 
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The Commonwealth notes that the trial court gave the 
correct instruction for voluntary intoxication immediately 
before repeating the instruction in which it omitted"not." It 
also argues the court instructed the jury that "[v]oluntary 
intoxication may reduce the crime of murder from first 
degree, to third degree," immediately after  the incorrect 
instruction. App. Appendix Vol. III, at 789. However, while 
a single defect does not necessarily make an instruction 
erroneous, see Henderson, a defect in a charge may result 
in legal error if the rest of the instruction contains language 
that merely contradicts and does not explain the defective 
language in the instruction. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 322; 
see also United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 733 
(finding an instruction on reasonable doubt to be 
unconstitutional, where a later clarification of the term did 
not serve to "unring the bell"). As the Supreme Court 
explained in Francis, 471 U.S. at 322, other language in the 
instruction does not always serve to cure the error. This is 
so even when other language correctly explains the law. In 
Francis, the Court found that an erroneous jury instruction 
on intent created a mandatory presumption that the jury 
must infer a presumed fact if the state proved predicate 
facts. The Court concluded that this constitutional flaw had 
not been cured by subsequent language correctly explaining 
the operation of presumptions that immediately followed 
the challenged portion of the instruction. id.  at 319-20. The 
Court reasoned that the additional language would not 
have clarified the issue, and may have permitted another, 
impermissible interpretation by a reasonable juror. Id. at 
325. 
 
Here, the location of the error in context with the rest of 
the charge, considered along with the correct, but 
confusing language in the instruction, causes us to view 
this "single deficiency" as quite problematic. Neither the 
correct statements of law within the instruction, nor the 
statement immediately after the instruction, completely 
negated or explained the absolutely incorrect statement of 
law in the context of the rest of the instructions. Moreover, 
the first correct statement of the law is itself somewhat 
confusing, because of the use of double negatives:"you 
cannot find the defendant guilty of first degree murder 
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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defendant was not so intoxicated at the time that he was 
incapable of judging his acts and consequences .. ." 
Appellants App. at 788-89 (emphasis added). The trial 
judge stated that he would repeat the instruction. However, 
it is likely that, upon hearing that, any juror who was even 
slightly confused by the previous instruction would have 
paid particular attention to the reiteration. That reiteration 
was, of course, incorrect. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 321 n.7 
(noting that, after hearing conflicting intent instructions, it 
is reasonable to expect a juror "to attempt to make sense of 
a confusing earlier portion of the instruction by reference to 
a later portion of the instruction"). 
 
Immediately before repeating the instruction, the judge 
correctly stated that the Commonwealth had the burden of 
disproving the defense, but then misstated the law. Thus, 
it is reasonably likely, when considered in the context of the 
instructions on voluntary intoxication, that a juror believed 
that the defendant had to prove intoxication beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that the Commonwealth had the 
burden of disproving the defense by a lesser standard. 
Compare Humanik, 871 F.2d 442-43 (instructions 
unconstitutionally placed the burden of proof on the 
defendant)," and Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 111 
(3d Cir. 1997) (no due process problem where defendant 
not entitled under federal law to have instruction contain 
certain elements of justification defense, contrasting cases 
where instruction unconstitutionally shifts burden of proof 
of an element onto defendant, in violation of due process). 
 
Because it is reasonably likely that a juror interpreted 
the instruction as allowing a finding of specific intent to kill 
based on something less than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the instruction arguably denied Whitney the due 
process of law. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 321 n.7. 
 
The sentence immediately subsequent to the disputed 
phrase, stating that voluntary intoxication may reduce a 
murder from first degree to third degree, conceivably cured 
part of the problem. However, that explanation said nothing 
about the standard of proof required for intoxication. It did 
not explain that the Commonwealth was required to 
disprove intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 
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Whitney did not have to prove intoxication beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Humanik, 871 F.2d at 442-43. 
 
Thus, the Commonwealth's claim that "given the court's 
charge as a whole, no reasonable juror could possibly have 
concluded that Whitney could be found guilty of first degree 
murder only if he was intoxicated," Appellants Br. at 69, 
misses the point. The problem is not only that a reasonable 
juror might have actually believed that to be the case. The 
greater problem is that it was reasonably likely that a juror 
believed that intoxication had to be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt and/or that the prosecution then had to 
disprove the defense by a lower standard of proof. It is 
unreasonable and improper to assume that lay persons can 
recognize that an incorrect standard of proof has been 
described in a jury instruction. 
 
       "Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing 
       instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same 
       way that lawyers might. Differences among them in 
       interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in 
       the deliberative process, with commonsense 
       understanding of the instructions in the light of all that 
       has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over 
       technical hairsplitting." 
 
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990). However, 
expecting jurors' "common sense" judgment to prevail over 
the court's instructions would conflict with the 
presumption that juries follow their instructions. See Zafrio 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993). We presume 
"that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend 
closely the particular language of the trial court's 
instruction in a criminal case and strive to understand, 
make sense of, and follow the instructions given them." 
Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n. 9. Accordingly, we agree with 
the district court's conclusion that the trial court's charge 




Of course, our conclusion that the charge was erroneous 
does not end our inquiry. Instructional errors must often be 
examined for harmless error before a defendant is entitled 
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to relief. See Smith, 120 F.3d at 417 n.5 (citing Kontakis v. 
Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, the 
harmless error test announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619 (1993), bears on our analysis. Under Brecht, 
an error must have a "substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict" before it can be 
considered harmful and require relief. 507 U.S. at 632 n.7. 
 
Moreover, Whitney alleges not only that the jury 
instruction was unconstitutionally infirm, but also that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial. In order 
to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Whitney 
must establish that trial counsel's stewardship fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and that counsel's 
dereliction was prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.18 
Given our discussion of the nature of the defect in this 
charge, and the problems that arise from it, it follows a 
fortiori that unless counsel had a strategic reason for not 
objecting, Whitney will satisfy the first prong of Strickland. 
Whitney has not offered any testimony about trial counsel's 
reasons for not objecting, and Whitney has the burden of 
establishing ineffectiveness. However, we can not imagine 
any justification for a defense attorney not attempting to 
correct this kind of error in an instruction on the only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Whitney argues that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
exhausted. The Commonwealth disagrees. The district court concluded 
that "[i]t is undisputed that Whitney has no remaining avenue in the 
courts of Pennsylvania for litigating any of the claims he has alleged in 
his amended petition," and that "it is conceded that Whitney did not 
pursue, either on direct appeal or in his PCRA proceeding, a number of 
the claims alleged in his pending petition." Dist. Ct. Op. at 3. 
 
The ineffective assistance of counsel claim actually has three 
components. In addition to challenging trial counsel's failure to object 
to 
the charge, Whitney argues that trial counsel did not adequately 
investigate his intoxication before trial, and that he was ineffective in 
failing to present certain testimony related to his intoxication. We will 
limit our discussion to the first of these three components because our 
analysis as to that part of his claim disposes of the remaining 
components of his ineffectiveness claim. Moreover, that is the only claim 
that the district court reached, and it is the only ruling that is 
challenged on appeal. 
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defense his/her client could possibly have to a charge of 
capital murder. 
 
However, in order to establish the requisite prejudice to 
satisfy the second prong of Strickland, Whitney must 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that the result would 
have been different but for the professional errors." Deputy 
v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d. Cir. 1994). Because 
Whitney alleges in this one claim both a due process 
violation based upon the faulty jury instruction and a Sixth 
Amendment violation based upon counsel's failure to 
object, it is not readily apparent whether the Brecht 
standard for harmless error and/or the Strickland standard 
of prejudice should be applied.19 However, we need not 
resolve that subtlety because, given the circumstances 
here, the ultimate issue under either test reduces to 
determining what effect, if any, the erroneous instruction 
had on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, if Whitney 
demonstrates that the erroneous instruction had a 
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 
the jury's verdict," such that it was not harmless under 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, he has also demonstrated that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. He would 
also have paved the way to excusing the procedural default 
by establishing "cause." See Coleman, supra. With these 
principles as our guide, we will examine the trial testimony 
to determine if Whitney can meet this burden. 
 
The district court explained its conclusion that the 
erroneous charge warranted habeas relief as follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The district court held that Whitney had established prejudice under 
Strickland. Dist. Ct. Op. at 21. The court did not apply the harmless 
error test of Brecht before finding prejudice under Strickland. Some cases 
have held that if a habeas petitioner meets the Strickland test, then 
he/she need not also demonstrate that the error was harmful. See Hill 
v. Lockhart, 28 F.3d 832, 838 (8th cir. 1994) (holding that analysis 
under Brecht harmless error test is unnecessary in evaluation of whether 
petitioner in habeas case has presented constitutionally significant claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 974, 
976 (4th cir. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that prejudice inquiry under 
Strickland is essentially the same inquiry as the harmless error inquiry). 
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       Given that there was sufficient evidence of Whitney's 
       intoxication to make his state of mind a question for 
       the jury, and given that the judge improperly 
       instructed the jury on the law of specific intent and 
       voluntary intoxication, there is a "reasonable 
       probability" that, but for counsel's omission,"the result 
       of the proceeding would have been different." Id. [citing 
       Strickland.] Had counsel objected at trial, the court 
       could easily have corrected the error and made the 
       proper instruction clear. There is a reasonable 
       probability that, if the error in the charge had been 
       corrected, at least one juror would not have voted to 
       convict petitioner of first degree murder. Our 
       confidence in the conviction and sentence has been 
       undermined by the seriously deficient representation of 
       trial counsel. We conclude that Whitney has 
       successfully established his claim of ineffective 
       assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
       Amendments. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 21. We disagree. The evidence of Whitney's 
state of mind was such that the integrity of his conviction 
for first degree murder is not undermined in the least by 
the erroneous jury charge. 
 
It is uncontroverted that the victim suffered twenty-four 
stab wounds, including a deep wound to the head, and 
another wound to the ventricle of his heart. In 
Pennsylvania, specific intent to kill may be demonstrated 
by nothing more than use of a deadly weapon upon a vital 
part of the body. See Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237, 
656 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1995) (finding specific intent where 
victim suffered five stab wounds to upper body); 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 540 Pa. 80, 656 A.2d 90, 95 
(1995) (finding specific intent where defendant shot one 
victim in head and chest, another victim twice in the head, 
and stated his intent to kill victim before shooting). Thus, 
in Commonwealth v. Meredith, 490 Pa. 303, 311, 416 A.2d 
481, 485 (1980), based upon the number and severity of 
the blows inflicted, areas of the body where the blows were 
administered, and relative size and age of the victim, the 
court stated: "[i]f a deadly force is knowingly applied by the 
actor to the person of another, the intent to take life is as 
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evident as if the actor stated the intent to kill at the time 
the force was applied." 
 
Here, of course, Whitney did just that. He proclaimed his 
intent to kill during the course of his intrusion into the 
deceased's apartment. The jurors did not have to rely upon 
the circumstantial evidence of the number and severity of 
the wounds to determine if Whitney intended to kill. They 
could merely take him at his word. Whitney's 
announcement of his intent perfectly coincides with, and 
explains, the location and number of the victim's wounds. 
See Commonwealth v. Ford, 539 Pa. 85, 650 A.2d 433, 437 
(1994) (specific intent to commit crime may be established 
through defendant's words or acts, or circumstantial 
evidence, considered with all reasonable inferences from 
that evidence) (citing Commonwealth v. Iacobino , 319 Pa. 
65, 178 A. 823 (1935)). There was, therefore, no real issue 
about whether his blows just happened to land on a vital 
part of the victim's body. 
 
Of course, the prosecution's burden in a criminal case is 
a high one. A capable defense attorney might attempt to 
raise a reasonable doubt by arguing to the jury that 
Whitney was so intoxicated that he did not know what he 
was saying, that he was simply ranting in a drunken 
stupor, and that his blows just happened to land on vital 
organs as he coincidentally stated an "intent" to kill. 
However, that was not the evidence. Whitney did not flail 
his arms about in a wild, unfocused, and uncontrolled 
manner. Nor was he ranting when he expressed his intent 
to kill his victim. Rather, the evidence easily establishes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew exactly what he 
was saying, and exactly what he was doing. Murtaza 
testified that Whitney's demeanor was calm and collected. 
This is corroborated by his behavior while he was in her 
apartment. In the middle of that burglary, while struggling 
with Murtaza, he walked to her refrigerator to get a drink 
of water after ripping her clothes off and announcing that 
he was going to rape her and kill her husband. 
 
We realize, of course, that there was evidence that 
Whitney was woozy, and that his speech was slurred, and 
he had alcohol on his breath. However, that is merely what 
entitled him to a voluntary intoxication charge. It must be 
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considered in context with the entire record, most of which 
is undisputed. For example, it is undisputed that Whitney 
was only able to perpetrate these attacks after he climbed 
onto a second-story ledge and then climbed through not 
one, but two windows. He was sufficiently cognizant to 
realize that his first victim might identify him, and he 
therefore inquired about her ability to recognize him. He 
then again negotiated the second-story ledge once again 
and maneuvered to the apartment where the fatal stabbing 
occurred. There, he was again able to climb from the ledge 
through a window. That is not consistent with the actions 
of one who is in a drunken stupor. 
 
However, the most telling evidence of Whitney's lucid 
mental state is the fastidious manner in which he 
attempted to prevent Ms. Minor from speaking on the 
telephone. We refer not merely to his instructions to her 
when she tried to place a telephone call, but his actions in 
disabling her telephone as well. In disabling that phone, 
Whitney demonstrated motor coordination and dexterity, as 
well as presence of mind and cognition that was totally 
inconsistent with the level of impairment that might create 
a reasonable doubt about one's ability to form the specific 
intent to kill. He did not merely cut the telephone wires, he 
disassembled the telephone, unscrewed the speaker portion 
of the handset, and removed the microphone inside. He 
thereby rendered the phone inoperable. See id.  at 357. 
 
In addition, when Murtaza emptied her purse Whitney 
had sufficient mental facility to appreciate the amount of 
money she had and express disappointment that she did 
not have more. And he similarly demonstrated his intent to 
rape Murtaza, and clearly demonstrated an intent to do so 
by opening his pants and taking out his penis, just as he 
demonstrated his intent to kill by announcing his intent 
and then stabbing his victim twenty-four times. 
 
A verdict may still stand, despite erroneous jury 
instructions, where the predicate facts "conclusively 
establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the 
defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not 
intend to cause the injury." Rose v. Clark , 478 U.S. 570, 
580-81 (1986). "In that event . . . [,] the jury has found, in 
Winship's words, `every fact necessary' to establish every 
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element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Carella 
v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (per curiam) 
(quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 580-81). That is what we have 
here. 
 
"Surely, there is no substantial likelihood [this] erroneous 
. . . instruction[ ] prejudiced [Whitney's] chances with the 
jury." Frady, 456 U.S. at 174; See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776, 782 n.5 (1987) (erroneous instruction was 
harmless where evidence was so dispositive of intent that it 
could be said beyond a reasonable doubt that jury's 
deliberations were not affected by them). Faced with this 
evidence we do not understand how any reasonable jury 
could have had any doubt about whether Whitney was too 
inebriated to form the intent to kill. The evidence of 
Whitney's mental state was nothing short of overwhelming. 
Accordingly, we can not agree with the district court's 
conclusion that the erroneous instruction in any way 
undermined this verdict. Whitney's claim of prejudice fails 
under both Brecht and Strickland. There is no reasonable 
probability that, "but for counsel's failure to object to the 
faulty instruction, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Sistrunk, 96 F.3d at 670). Similarly, the 
erroneous instruction could not have had a "substantial 
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 
verdict." Brecht, supra. 
 
D. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice / Actual 
       Innocence  
 
As noted above, we also excuse a procedural default 
where failure to excuse it would result in a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we will adjudicate the 
merits of a defaulted claim where it is more likely than not 
that no reasonable juror would have convicted a defendant 
absent the claimed error. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
326, (1995) (adopting the standard articulated in Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). We also conduct this 
inquiry into "actual innocence" "in light of all the evidence, 
including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but 
with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence 
tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have 
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become available only after the trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 
327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (quotation omitted). 
 
Whitney does not even have a colorable claim of actual 
innocence. In his amended habeas petition, he made an 
assertion in the context of another of his claims that he did 
not commit the homicide, and that "[a]t best, Mr. Whitney 
was merely a lookout with, at most, the intent to commit a 
burglary." Amended Habeas Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, at 151. He does not renew that assertion here. 
Moreover, in light of the foregoing discussion of the 
evidence of his intoxication, it is obvious that Whitney was 
not so intoxicated as to be unable to form the intent to kill. 
Accordingly, Whitney does not fall under the "actually 
innocent of the death penalty" exception that would have 
allowed the district court to reach the merits of his 
challenge to the jury instruction. See Schlup , supra. We 
therefore conclude that the district court erred in granting 




In Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2000), we 
stated: 
 
       [w]e are not unaware of the controversy currently 
       surrounding the imposition of the death penalty in this 
       country. However, this case does not trench upon the 
       issues [so often] in the forefront of that controversy, 
       usually identification of the defendant or the 
       defendant's competency at any of the critical stages of 
       the event or the criminal proceeding. . . . Whether this 
       is an appropriate case for administration of the death 
       penalty is a political question, not a judicial one. 
 
Similarly, our task here is limited to reviewing the propriety 
of the district court's grant of habeas relief based upon the 
record and Whitney's assertions of error. For all the reasons 
set forth above, we hold that the district court's order 
granting habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 must be 
vacated, and we will remand the matter for consideration of 
the remaining claims in Whitney's amended habeas 
petition. In doing so, we take no position as to whether the 
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district court is precluded from reaching the merits of any 
of those claims based upon any procedural default. 
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